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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past two decades, Mexico has reformed its antiquated
arbitration machinery. The country signed and ratified the United
* LL.M. University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Washington University, A.B. Duke
University. My thanks to Professor Whitmore Gray of the University of Michigan Law
School for his comments and insight and Assistant Clinical Professor Yvonne Mena for her
careful review of the manuscript.
I also need to thank Pablo Perezalonso, a member of Mexico's NAFTA negotiation team,
for his insights into Mexican law and Shannon Baker and Laura Zynda for their time,
assistance, and understanding.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards' (the "New York Convention") and the Inter-Amer-
ican Convention on International Commercial Arbitration2 (the
"Panama Convention"), which together bind Mexico to the prevailing
international framework for enforcing arbitral clauses and awards.
The Mexican court system has, in turn, enforced Convention princi-
ples in three publicized court decisions-the only such decisions in all
of Latin America. 3 Recently, the national legislature overhauled cen-
tury-old arbitration law in the Code of Civil Procedure for the Fed-
eral District (the "procedural code") and the Federal Commercial
Code (the "commercial code") in order to implement the principles of
the two Conventions.
These developments, especially the recent modifications to the
commercial code and the procedural code, deserve close examination.
Mexico plays an increasingly important role in the international econ-
omy, and foreign companies will increasingly enter into relationships
with Mexican companies.' Many such companies will conclude, how-
l. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Oct. 1,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518 [hereinafter New York Convention].
2. Convention on International Conventional Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 336
[hereinafter Panama Convention].
3. See infra part II.C,2.
4. Each Mexican state and the federal district has its own code of civil procedure. This
article only examines the Code of Civil Procedure for the Federal District because 40% of the
people live in the Federal District and because it serves as the model for all other states. Thus,
all "procedural code" references herein are to the Code of Civil Procedure for the Federal
District. C6digo de Procedimientos Civiles para el Distrito Federal [C.P.C.D.F.]. Mexico has
only one commercial code, effective as of January 1, 1890, because the Constitution grants the
federal government the right to control commercial matters. CONST. art. 73(X) (amended
1942 and 1947). Originally, the commercial code dealt with all commercial matters. Now
separate statutory schemes address all substantive matters such as banking and insurance.
These codes have undergone gradual reform. The 1988 and 1989 reforms analyzed infra
part II.C.3 comprise the only significant reforms related to international commercial
arbitration. I generally have chosen, therefore, when referring to the pre-reform arbitral law,
to generally cite only to the 1985 commercial code and 1978 procedural code, although I
discuss other years when appropriate.
The Mexican State civil codes, which set forth substantive Mexican law, do not bear on
the procedural issues raised by arbitration. The Federal Code of Civil Procedure addresses
arbitration in one provision that incorporates the local codes of civil procedure. C6digo
Federal de Procedimientos Civiles (C.F.P.C.] (referring to enforcement of foreign judgments).
It is, therefore, not addressed in this article.
5. The Salinas government has privatized much of the previously sluggish socialist
economy, entered into liberalized trade pacts with other countries, actively sought formation
of a North American trading block, and generally improved its image among countries of the
world. The government has geared these steps toward increasing both foreign investment in
the country and exportation of goods to the United States and other industrialized countries.
See Alexander C. Hoagland, Modification of Mexican Arbitration Law, 7 J. INT'L ARn. 91
(1990) (noting that Mexico is undergoing a radical opening to international trade and private
investment, privatization of some state-owned enterprises, a major commitment to private- and
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ever, that Mexico's legal system does not provide a hospitable forum
for the resolution of any resulting disputes. Indeed, the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") expressly encourages the use
of private dispute resolution.6
Mexican arbitration principles differ significantly from prevailing
international norms. For over a century, the "publicista'" school of
arbitration theory has guided Mexican arbitration law. The propo-
nents of the "publicista" theory consider arbitration as a private act,
inseparable from its public consequences and properly subject to
extensive governmental control.7 Under prevailing international
norms exemplified by the Conventions, however, parties may agree to
broad arbitration clauses and flexible arbitration procedures that dele-
gate expansive powers to arbitrators. These principles are designed to
lead to "speedy enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards,
limited but effective judicial intervention to safeguard the integrity of
the proceedings and advance the arbitral process, support for party
autonomy in fashioning the arbitral forum, and the liberation of inter-
national arbitration from parochial concepts of domestic law."8
Although Mexico now appears to endorse these norms, both through
the Conventions and the recent reforms, any lingering notion of arbi-
tration as a public act would undercut the effectiveness of that
endorsement.
export-led growth, and significant political changes). See generally Rodolfo C. Miramontes,
Present Legal Framework of International Trade Between Mexico and the U.S.A.: The Need
for a Change, Remarks at Mexico-United States Arbitration Conference (Oct. 18, 1990)
(transcript on file with American Arbitration Association) (describing Mexican interest in free
trade with the United States and other industrial powers).
6. North American Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 7, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., § 2022, -
U.S.T. -; see POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES OF
THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT, USITC pub. 2596, Inv. No. 332-337
(Jan. 1993) (summarizing and analyzing the proposed NAFTA).
7. E.g., Ignacio M. Lima, El Arbitraje Privado en Nuestro Derecho, 38 REVISTA DE LA
FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MEXICO 163 (1988) (explaining that the publicista theory does
not view the arbitral contract as a private agreement, but as a transfer of the state's
adjudicatory powers to the arbitrators and noting that Mexican law exhibits qualities of both
currents-the "privatista" and "jurisdiccionalista"); Julio C. Trevino, El Arbitraje Comerical
Internaccional: Un Recurso para America Latina, 1988 REVISTA DE INVESTIGACIONES
JURIDICAS 323, 329 (explaining that arbitration consists of a private element, the agreement,
and a public element, the procedural law to which the agreement, arbitration, and award must
comply). Consider, by contrast, views espoused in the United States after liberalization of its
arbitration clauses. In a famous quotation from The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., the U.S.
Supreme Court stated that the United States "cannot have trade and commerce in world
markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved
in our courts." 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
8. Michael F. Hoellering, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States, I
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 14, 17 (1990) (espousing goals of commercial arbitration law as
delineated by the General Counsel of the American Arbitration Association).
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Whether Mexico now has discarded the publicista structure is
important because the availability of private dispute resolution is criti-
cal to increasing international trade with Mexican companies. Mex-
ico is a civil law country with many code provisions that differ from
the laws of common-law regimes, particularly those of the United
States.9 Unlike many centralized civil law countries, Mexico has a
federal system with decentralized power."° Mexico has federal laws
and federal courts, while each of the Mexican states and the Distrito
Federal (the federal district that includes Mexico City) has its own
civil code, procedural laws, and courts." Mexico's legal system thus
differs significantly from both common law and civil law countries.
Moreover, even if a potential investor were familiar with the Mexican
9. See Hope H. Camp, Jr., Binding Arbitration: A Preferred Alternative for Resolving
Commercial Disputes Between Mexican and U.S. Businessmen, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 717, 720-21
(1991) (including as important distinctions: civil code of Mexico limits damages whereas laws
of the United States create opportunities for unlimited damages; in Mexico, trial evidence
mainly is presented by documentation in front of the judges who question the witnesses; and
Mexican law provides for a more limited pre-trial discovery).
10. Mexico is properly known as the United States of Mexico.
11. For a good discussion of the sources of Mexican law, see Edward H. Kurth,
Adjudicative Resolution of Commercial Disputes Between Nationals of the United States and
Mexico, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 597 (1983). According to Kurth,
The principal sources of Mexican law which bear upon the resolution of
international commercial conflicts are the Constitution of the United Mexican
States, Civil Code for the Federal District and Territories of Mexico,
Commercial Code of Mexico, and Code of Civil Procedure for the Federal
District and Territories of Mexico .... The Civil Code forms the heart of the
Mexican legal system. It is divided into four books covering persons, property,
succession, and obligations. The obligations section includes the subject of
contracts. The Civil Code does not, however, broadly encompass commercial
law, a subject separately treated by the Commercial Code. The Mexican
Commercial Code generally deals with commercial acts and transactions which
are for pecuniary profit. Thus, contracts for transportation by land, drafts, bills
of exchange, and other banking activities are governed by the Commercial Code
to the substantial exclusion of the Civil Code .... Because there are some matters
which are dealt with in both the Commercial and Civil Codes, some only in the
Civil Code, and some in neither Code, rules have been established for
determining whether a contract or an issue arising under a contract will be
controlled by the Commercial or Civil Code. The principal guidelines seem to
be: (1) the Civil Code provisions which detail the legal requirements respecting
capacity of the parties and exceptions and causes which rescind or invalidate
agreements apply to commercial contracts; (2) if the Commercial Code is
applicable to a transaction or an issue derived from the transaction, its
pronouncements prevail over any contrary provisions in the Civil Code; (3) the
Civil Code will be invoked to cover "gaps" in the Commercial Code ... ; and
(4) when no specific Commercial or Civil Code article is decisive, then "[j]udicial
controversies of a civil nature shall be decided in accordance with the letter of the
law or its juridical interpretation. In the absence of a law, they shall be decided
in accordance with general legal principles."
Id. at 598 n.5.
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legal system, she still would have to consider issues of corruption and
delay that, sadly, are still common to Mexico, including, to some
extent, its court system.1 2
This article analyzes the recent changes in Mexican arbitration
law, with particular emphasis on the 1988 and 1989 reforms to the
commercial code and the procedural code, in order to determine
whether Mexican arbitration law is consistent with the prevailing
international theory of arbitration. Part II describes traditional Mexi-
can treatment of arbitration, including an explanation of the tradi-
tional pre-reform arbitral mechanisms. Part II asserts that the
traditionally low level of commercial arbitration in Mexico did not
arise exclusively from ignorance of or hostility to private dispute reso-
lution-the conventional explanations-but from extensive govern-
mental control over arbitration procedure. Part III describes recent
reforms and developments and argues that, in substance, the reformed
Mexican arbitration law still draws upon the publicista model of arbi-
tration. Part IV addresses the consequences of the reforms and con-
cludes that Mexican arbitration is now a quirky and ill-defined
procedure in transition to a modern arbitration regime. Part IV fur-
ther offers some practical strategies for overcoming the entrenched
procedural hurdles.
II. TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION IN MEXICO
Commercial arbitration rarely settles international commercial
disputes in Mexico and other Latin American countries.13 The con-
ventional wisdom is that Latin Americans are uncomfortable with
12. The prevalence of "La Mordida," the bite, in Mexico is legendary. Patrick Oster, a
lawyer turned journalist, offers a "biting" description of corruption in Mexican courts:
Even the Mexican courts are up to their gavels in bribery. Leaders of local bar
associations openly complain that many judges are on the take, handing out
justice to the highest bidder. Trial lawyers regularly bitch that they have to pay
"tips" to court clerks and judges just to get routine papers filed. Defense
attorney Hector Montoya Fernandez got so riled up about the need to pay people
off in the Mexico City court system that he held a press conference in 1985 to
charge that the courts were "teeming with rats, filth and corruption, with only a
few honorable exceptions." He said court officials "were nothing but booty
hunters who keep lawyers on both sides of a case running around uselessly until
they [the lawyers] decide to accept the corrupt system and pay.
PATRICK OSTER, THE MEXICANS: A PERSONAL PORTRAIT OF A PEOPLE 182 (1989).
13. As of 1988, the Permanent Commission on Arbitration of the National Chamber of
Commerce of Mexico City had handled very few matters. Trevino, supra note 7, at 343.
Similarly, the Mexican Center for Commercial Arbitration, founded by leading businessmen,
has had little business and success. Id. at 343; see also Hoagland, supra note 5, at 92 ("For a
century, the [commercial code] has provided principally for judicial arbitration according to
agreed rules before a court, a procedure noteworthy for its desuetude."); Frank E. Nattier,
International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America: Enforcement of Arbitration
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arbitration and, as a result, Latin American people engaged in busi-
ness and law commonly refer private commercial disputes to the
courts. 4 These observations, made by sophisticated and knowledgea-
ble observers, undoubtedly have some validity. Nevertheless, the
observations are misleading because they suggest that hostility causes
the low level of arbitration where any hostility more likely results, at
least in part, from the character of the arbitration laws.' 5
A. The History of Arbitration in Mexico
Latin American legal culture long has favored the resolution of
conflict through negotiation and mediation rather than through litiga-
tion. 6 Accordingly, the political and academic establishment in
Latin America has promoted arbitration since the 19th century.
Agreements and Awards, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 397, 399 (1986) (exploring why arbitration is used
so infrequently in Latin America as compared to Western Europe).
14. Raphael E. Echeverria & Jos6 L. Siqueiros, Arbitration In Latin American Countries,
in ARBITRATION IN SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES INVOLVING
THE FAR EAST AND ARBITRATION IN COMBINED TRANSPORTATION 81, 82 (Pieter Sanders
ed., 1989) (International Council for Commercial Arbitration Congress Series No. 4, 1989)
[hereinafter ICCA Series 4] (finding that because commercial arbitration has been part of the
Latin American commercial and civil codes since the 19th century, its failure to take root
"may only be explained as a consequence of the traditional view that international arbitration
was a surrogate for diplomatic intervention by the great powers."); Alden F. Abbot, Latin
America and International Arbitration Conventions: The Quandary of Non-Ratification, 17
HARV. INT'L L.J. 131, 136-37 (1976) (explaining regional distrust of foreign private
arbitrations with Latin American states); Donald B. Straus, Why International Commercial
Arbitration is Lagging in Latin America, 33 ARB. J. 21, 21-22 (1978) (noting that Latin
Americans show reluctance to participate in private arbitration as a result of lack of familiarity
and circulating horror stories); Bruce G. Rinker, Note, The Future of Arbitration in Latin
America: A Study of its Regional Development, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 480, 485 (1976)
(noting the low level of arbitration reflects inherent distrust of foreign intervention and
control).
15. For example, in El Arbitraje Comercial en Mexico, Professor Siqueiros stated that
Mexican businessmen were unfamiliar with the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration
Commission [IACAC] rules and were reluctant to submit their differences to foreign
arbitrators. He did not suggest, however, that Mexican businessmen and lawyers did not know
the Mexican law pertaining to arbitration nor did he claim that Mexicans were wary of
submitting commercial disputes to Mexican arbitrators. Jos6 L. Siqueiros, El Arbitraje
Comercial en Mexico, 15 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MEXICO 703, 719
(1965).
16. See ICCA Series 4, supra note 14, at 81-2 ("[ajlong with the old Spanish rules the
Latin American legislatures imported from Europe the concept of peaceful settlement of
disputes by third party arbitrators"); Hector M. Gonzalez, Breve Resena Historica del
Arbitraje, 38 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MEXICO 216, 225 (1988) (virtually
all civil matters were theoretically susceptible to arbitration from 1870 forward); Lionel M.
Summers, Arbitration and Latin America, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 5 (1972) (explaining that
arbitration had a bright future in the early history of Latin America); Trevino, supra note 7, at
338 (arguing that Latin America has had a tradition favorable to arbitration but has not
produced hoped-for results); Carlos Villareal, Culture in Lawmaking: A Chicano Perspective,
24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1193 (1991) (examining difference between Mexican and American
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Cooperation on arbitration between Latin American govern-
ments has persisted for over a century-far longer, in fact, than the
United States' efforts to modernize its arbitration law.17 From the
late 19th century until the relatively recent ratification of the New
York and Panama Conventions, Latin American countries, including
Mexico, have engaged in a continuing dialogue regarding the recipro-
cal recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards. 8
Since the 19th century, detailed provisions in the procedural
code have governed Mexican arbitration.' 9 The 1884 procedural code
contained detailed procedures permitting merchants to resolve dis-
putes outside of trial, as well as similar, less detailed procedures for
non-merchants.2 ° When the commercial code was first promulgated
in 1890, it adopted the procedural code provisions governing dispute
procedures and concluding that Mexican and American legal cultures conflicted because
Mexico emphasized mediation and other forms of informal dispute resolution).
17. The first federal arbitration act in the United States was adopted in 1925. United
States Arbitration Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925).
18. Latin American countries first addressed international commercial arbitration and the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards with the Montevideo Treaty of 1889. Charles R.
Norberg, Recent Developments in Inter-American Commercial Arbitration, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 86, 87 (1991). Additionally, the 1928 Bustamonte Code regarding private
international law provided for the reciprocal enforcement of arbitral awards among signatory
countries. Id. at 88. In 1933, the Seventh International Conference of American States
promulgated resolution XLI providing that "an Inter-American commercial agency be
appointed in order.., to assume, as one of its most important functions, the responsibility of
establishing an inter-American system of arbitration." Id. (citing Resolution of December 23,
1933, Seventh International Conference of American States, Montevideo, Uruguay).
This resolution led to the 1934 formation, under the auspices of both the Pan American
Union and the American Arbitration Association, of the Inter-American Commercial
Arbitration Association. Id. In 1940, the second Montevideo Treaty sought again to
modernize the international commercial arbitration and the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards. Id. at 87.
In 1956, under the urging of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-
American Counsel of Jurists met in Mexico City and drafted a model law that was never
adopted. Id. at 88 (citing Draft Uniform Law on Inter-American Commercial Arbitration,
Resolution VIII of the Third Meeting of the Inter-American Council of Jurists, Mexico City,
Mexico, at 55 (1956)). In 1967, the Inter-American Judicial Committee met in Rio de Janeiro
and prepared a draft Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration.
Id. (citing Report of the Inter-American Juridical Committee on International Commercial
Arbitration, February 19, 1968, OAS Doc. SER i/vi (1968)). This proposal was considered in
Panama in 1975 at the First Specialized Inter-American Conference on Private International
Law and was adopted as an OAS convention and eventually signed as the Panama Convention.
Id. at 88 (citing Organization of American States, Inter-American Specialized Conference on
Private International Law (CIDIP 1) held in Panama City, Republic of Panama, Jan. 14-29,
1975).
19. See ICCA Series 4, supra note 14, at 82 (explaining that most of the Latin American
countries enacted codes in the second half of the 19th century regulating arbitration).
20. The Code of Civil Procedure of the Federal District became effective on August 13,
1872 and displaced all prior procedural provisions. Gonzalez, supra note 16, at 224;
C.P.C.D.F. art. 1240 (1884) (the parties have right to submit their differences to arbitral suit).
1993]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
resolution between merchants and denominated such procedures
"Mercantile Suits." The procedural code continued to provide for
arbitral suits for non-merchants.
During the 20th century, Mexico developed numerous, although
underutilized, arbitral institutions. A resolution at the 1934 Monte-
video Conference founded the Permanent Arbitration Commission of
the National Chamber of Commerce. Under the 1953 Law of Cham-
bers of Commerce and Industry, special Chamber of Commerce com-
missions were to act as arbitrators for commercial disputes." Also, as
of the mid-1960s, the National Committee of the Inter-American
Commercial Arbitration Commission (IACAC) began to provide
arbitration facilities.22 In the mid-1980s, with support from the busi-
ness and legal community, Mexico established the Centro Mexicano
de Arbitraje Comercial (Mexican Center for Commercial Arbitration)
to provide facilities and information for arbitration.23
The Mexican academic community also has paid close attention
to the theory and actual practice of arbitration.24 Dr. Jose Luis
Siqueiros, perhaps the foremost authority on Mexican arbitration,
recognized in 1965 that provisions for mercantile suits "had become a
dead letter or at most they existed only as conventional trials in front
of arbitrators."25  Since then, he and other commentators have
encouraged change and reform. Some commentators, however, have
taken issue with his interpretation of Mexican law and proposals for
reform.
Thus, the legal culture of Mexico, its laws, and its political and
academic powers have shown strong interest and familiarity with
arbitration. Any discussion of Mexico's arbitration laws must begin
with the premise that Mexican arbitration is a well-established,
sophisticated component of Mexican law. The "dead letter" status of
arbitration must then lie, at least in part, in the character of the arbi-
tration procedure itself.
21. Siqueiros, supra note 15, at 718-19.
22. Id. at 719.
23. Nattier, supra note 13, at 422.
24. E.g., Fernando A.V. Pando, New Trends in Mexican Private International Law, 23
INT'L LAW. 995, 996 (1989) (explaining that for several years the Academia de Arbitraje
Commercial Internacional and the Academia Mexicana de Derecho Internacional Privado
have been promoting the improvement of Mexican law on international arbitration); Trevino,
supra note 7, at 323 (academic commentator promotes international commercial arbitration as
preferable alternative to litigation); see also Niceto Alcala-Zamora y Castillo, La Ejecucion de
las Sentencias Arbitrales en Mexico, BOLETIN DEL INSTITUTO DE DERECHO COMPARADO EN
MExIco, May-Aug. 1958 at 45. For a bibliography of academic commentary, see Lima, supra
note 7, at 166-67.
25. Siqueiros, supra note 15, at 705.
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B. The Influence of the Publicista School
A leading Mexican law professor, Dr. Ignacio Medina Lima,
defined Mexican arbitration as "una forma hetero-compositiva de
litigios en lo que un tercero imparcial, eligido por las partes 0 por el
organo que la ley determina, se encarga de resolver la cuestion
planteada, mediante un laudo que aquellos han de cumplir."26 This
definition of arbitration as a "composite heterogeneous form of litiga-
tion," rather than as a private consensual method of dispute resolu-
tion, is an accurate summary of the publicista theory.27 The arbitral
contract is not considered a voluntary relinquishment of the state's
jurisdiction, but rather a partial transfer of the state's jurisdiction to
arbitrators.28
The strength of the publicista theory lies in its connection to fun-
damental Mexican public policy. Article 14 of the Mexican Constitu-
tion enshrines regularity and fairness of procedure as a fundamental
guarantee of dispute resolution. Article 14 mandates that all dispute
resolution must be accomplished through formal trial: "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, possessions, or rights with-
out a trial by a duly created court in which the essential formalities of
procedure are observed in accordance with laws in effect prior to the
act."29 The procedural code implemented these guarantees by pre-
scribing non-waivable procedural formalities for all trials. 30 Among
other requirements, a tribunal must consider all pleadings and proof
submitted by the parties and deliver a clear, reasoned judgment on
such submissions, and individuals must be summoned to court via
personal service.3 Private consensual arbitration appears to violate
26. Lima, supra note 7, at 158. This translates as "a composite heterogenous form of
litigation in which a neutral third party, chosen by the parties or by an organ that the law
determines, is charged with resolving the matter at hand, mediating an award with which the
parties must comply."
27. Id.
28. Id. at 163; see also Trevino, supra note 7, at 329 (arbitration consists of a private
element, the agreement, and a public element, procedural law, to which the agreement,
arbitration and award must comply). The earliest arbitral mechanisms envisaged the courts
and the arbitrators working together on a case. See C.P.C.D.F. arts. 1298-1316 (1884).
29. CONST. art. 14.
30. See also CONST. art. 1 ("Every person in the United Mexican States shall enjoy the
guarantees granted by this Constitution, which cannot be restricted or suspended except in
such cases and under such conditions as are herein provided."); id. at art. 16 ("No one shall be
disturbed in his... possessions except by virtue of a written order by the competent authority
stating the legal grounds and justification for the actions taken."); id. at art. 17 ("Every person
is entitled to the administration of justice by courts .... ").
31. Article 55 of the procedural code provides, for example, that the parties may not by
agreement alter the specified procedure. Article 114(I) of the procedural code provides that
the first notice of any proceeding must be given via personal service. Article 81 of the
procedural code requires that "[]udgments must be clear, precise and in conformity with the
19931
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these fundamental guarantees.32 Accordingly, traditional Mexican
arbitral mechanisms incorporated procedural guarantees that mini-
mized the conflict with this fundamental Mexican public policy. 33
The provisions in the commercial code providing for "Mercantile
Suits" provided the primary source of pre-reform arbitration law.34
These provisions were extraordinarily restrictive and did not permit
the parties to significantly shape the dispute resolution procedure or
delegate power to the arbitrators.35
The commercial code bound a tribunal to follow the parties'
agreed procedure only if:
1. The Agreement was made in a public instrument or before the
judge trying the case;
2. The essential features of a lawsuit were preserved by the cho-
sen procedure;
3. Proof not admissible according to law was not agreed to be
admitted;
4. The jurisdiction of the court is preserved;
pleadings ... deciding all contested issues. When there are more than one contested issue, the
judgment must address each one." Article 283 of the procedural code provides that legally-
established methods of proof may not be renounced. Article 285 of the procedural code
provides that judges are always obligated to hear proofs presented by the parties.
32. One of the two leading Mexican arbitration scholars, Dr. Humberto Briseno Sierra,
the General Director of the Academia de Arbitraje Comercial Internacional, Mexico D.F.,
recognized the inherent barriers in the Mexican Constitution to arbitration:
Although the Mexican Constitution does not regard domestic [sic] arbitration
favorably, in practice both the Supreme Court and legal doctrine have never put
any obstacles in the way of recognition and enforcement of awards by judicial
authorities. The reason for the unfavorable treatment by the Constitution can be
found in the argument that the ordinary courts are appropriate to administer
justice and that special jurisdictions-other than in time of war-are forbidden.
1978 Y.B. COM. ARB., VOL. III. at 94; see also Lima, supra note 7, at 161 (describing long-
standing criticism of arbitration by Mexican legal experts in light of the fundamental guaran-
tees of the constitution); supra note 30.
33. For a thorough discussion of the origin of applicable Mexican laws, in particular the
laws pertaining to mercantile and arbitral suits, see generally Siqueiros, supra note 15. For a
complete pre-reform analysis of the Mexican arbitration law, see Humberto B. Sierra, El
Arbitraje Mercantil en Mexico, REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MEXICO, July-
Sept. 1977, at 499-567.
34. According to the commercial code: "Where pursuant to commercial law, one of the
parties ... deems the transaction as one of mercantile nature and the other party deems it as
one of civil nature, the dispute arising therefrom shall be governed by commercial laws."
C6d.Com. art. 1050.
35. The commercial code refers to "procidimiento convencional" and some translations
refer to a "conventional mercantile procedure," implying that the provisions referred to some
type of customary merchant law. See, e.g., JOSEPH WHELESS, COMPENDIUM OF THE LAWS
OF MEXICO 434 (1938) (referring to mercantile suits as "conventional procedure"). The
straightforward translation of "convencional" is simply "agreed." This translation is used
here because no section of the commercial code otherwise suggests that the mercantile suits
provisions have a connection with customary merchant law.
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5. The terms provided for law by decisions are not shortened; and
6. Other and different recourses than allowed by law for decisions
are not shortened.36
Additionally, the public document establishing the agreed procedures
had to identify the means of proof to be followed and the methods of
proof and legal recourses waived.37
These extensive restrictions bound mercantile suits closely to
court procedure and related procedural guarantees. The thrust of the
provisions modified court procedure but not private dispute resolu-
tion. The commercial code only applied to pending lawsuits arising
from a pre-existing dispute. 38 The submission specifically had to pre-
serve the essential formalities of trial and the list of procedural items
that the parties could not waive-rules of evidence, time periods for
decisions, and methods of appeal or review. This left little room for
private agreement. The commercial code also had a "bootstrap" pro-
vision that imported procedural rules into a mercantile suit. Under
these provisions, in the absence of agreed procedure, relevant provi-
sions of the commercial code or the local procedural code would con-
trol.39 In fact, other than one contradictory reference to an
"arbitrator" in a sub-clause describing the necessary components of
the submission, all pertinent provisions refer to judges and courts.'
These provisions effectively eliminated the differences between
regular and mercantile suits. Moreover, even if a party chose to
employ a mercantile suit, reaching agreement on the appropriate pro-
cedure within the circumscribed guidelines at the time of a dispute
would have been difficult. Any advantage of this procedure over a
traditional trial would have been slight.
The arbitral suit provisions of the procedural code were less
restrictive than the provisions of the commercial code. The proce-
dural code declared that the parties had the right to submit their dif-
ferences to arbitration through an arbitral clause in a private
36. C6d.Com. art. 1052 (1985).
37. C6d.Com. art. 1053 (1985).
38. The phrase "clausula compromisaria" refers to a private arbitration clause while the
word "compromiso" refers to an arbitral submission. See Siqueiros, supra note 15, at 707; see
also ICCA Series 4, supra note 14, at 84 n.9 and accompanying text (explaining the difference
between a submission, "compromiso," and an arbitration clause, "clausula compromisaria").
The mercantile suit provisions refer only to compromisos. Additionally, article 1052 of the
commercial code states that the submission may be made at any point during the lawsuit,
thereby implying that parties cannot use a prior agreement to subject a dispute to the
mercantile suit provisions. C6d.Com. art. 1052.
39. C6d.Com. art. 1051 (1985).
40. Compare C6d.Com. art. 1053(IX) (1985) (referring to judge or arbitrator) with
C6d.Com. art. 1049 (1985) (referring only to trials and not arbitration) and C6d.Com. art.
1052 (1985) (stating that judges must follow agreed procedure).
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contract. 41 Moreover, the procedural code did not require the agree-
ment to be in a public document or to specify the procedures to be
followed and the guarantees to be relinquished.
Nevertheless, arbitral suit provisions in the procedural code had
much in common with the mercantile suit provisions of the commer-
cial code. For example, the arbitral suit provisions did not establish
definitively the right to settle future disputes through private arbitra-
tion.42 A "bootstrap" provision that imported court rules to govern
matters not agreed by the parties also governed arbitral suits. 43 More-
over, the procedural code established a laundry list of mandatory and
default procedures-such as the hearing of proofs and pleadings, the
length of the arbitration and the grounds for challenging arbitrators-
that controlled arbitral procedure.'
The view that, for merchants, the arbitral suit provisions of the
procedural code merely complemented the right to a mercantile suit
under the commercial code compromised the limited freedom of the
procedural code. Dr. Humberto Briseno Sierra, a well-known adher-
ent to the publicista school,45 reasoned that any existing commercial
dispute--even if subject to a procedurally valid private agreement to
41. C.P.C.D.F. arts. 609 and 611 (1978). The earliest versions of the procedural code
provided for a burdensome procedure similar to the separate provisions for merchants later
adopted by the commercial code. For example, in the 1884 procedural code, an arbitral trial
required an agreement in a public notarial document or in a private document witnessed by
three persons containing the names and legal capacities of the parties; the names and addresses
of the arbitrators; the method of substitution for the arbitrators, including the name of the
individual to name the substitute; the matter or matters to be submitted to arbitration; the
length of the arbitration; the methods of proof; specification of those legal procedures
relinquished through the arbitration; and where the arbitration would be held and the sentence
delivered. C.P.C.D.F. arts. 1243-44 (1884).
42. The procedural code referred to both "compromisos" and "clausula compromisarias"
without indicating the significance of the references. Compare C.P.C.D.F. art. 611 (1978) with
id. art. 622 (1978).
43. Id. art. 619 (1978) ("[U]nless otherwise agreed the parties and the arbitrators will
follow in the proceedings the terms and forms prescribed for the courts.").
44. See id. art. 617 (fixing the length of the arbitration at 60 days in the absence of a
contrary agreement); id. art. 622 (outlining complex procedures for arbitrator substitution);
and id. art. 623 (limiting the grounds for arbitrator challenge).
The 1884 procedural code established these restrictive provisions which were
subsequently imported into the commercial code. Article 1354, for example, placed severe
limitations on the parties' ability to agree on applicable procedure:
It is not permitted for the parties to:
I. Agree to admit proofs not in conformity with law.
II. Shorten the terms allowed by law for judges and tribunals to rule.
III. Agree that they shall have more or different legal recourses than permitted
by law.
Id. art. 1354 (1884).




arbitrate future disputes--could not be adjudicated by arbitrators
absent compliance with the provisions governing mercantile suits.46
Dr. Jos6 L. Siqueiros, the leading Mexican advocate of arbitration
reform, considered the mercantile suit and arbitral suit provisions as
alternatives to a private agreement. Under his view, parties could
agree in a private document under the procedural code to settle future
disputes before an arbitrator or submit an existing dispute to a court
pursuant to a public document under the commercial code. Never-
theless, even parties with a valid agreement to arbitrate future dis-
putes faced the prospect of preparing a burdensome submission once a
dispute arose.
The emphasis on procedural regularity also affected the enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards. The procedural code, which gov-
erned enforcement, required that:
1. The plaintiff comply with the formalities prescribed by the
Federal Code of Civil Procedure for transmission of foreign
judgments;
2. The foreign judgment be rendered as part of a personal action;
3. The underlying obligation be enforceable under substantive
Mexican law;
4. The defendant be personally summoned to appear in the
suit;
5. The judgment could be executed under the laws of the nation
where it was rendered; and
6. The judgment be duly authenticated.47
Enforcement of arbitration awards also imposed procedural hurdles
derived from fundamental Mexican public policy. Most importantly,
if the requirements are taken at face value, even an international arbi-
tration was required to commence with personal service on the
defendant.
The history of arbitration in Mexico thus reflects a divergence
between desire and method. The culture and government have openly
embraced private dispute resolution. 48 The actual arbitration mecha-
46. See ICCA Series 4, supra note 14, at 84 n.9 (despite the fact that courts have construed
the reference to arbitral submission in the commercial code as extending to arbitral clauses,
"[e]xperts recommend that a submission . . . be signed (in a notarial document) to avoid
difficulties").
47. C.P.C.D.F. art. 605 (1978).
48. None of the enumerated restrictions reflect an aversion to arbitration. Long-standing
procedural code provisions grant arbitrators tremendous freedom where such provisions would
not undermine procedural fairness. See C.P.C.D.F. art. 608 (1978) (court prohibited from re-
examining merits of arbitrators' decision); C6d.Com. art. 1426 (1989) (granting arbitrators
freedom to select the applicable substantive law in the absence of agreement); C6d.Com. art.
1423 (V) (1989) ("In the arbitration agreement the parties may agree to: .... applicable laws
as to the merits of the dispute .... ").
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nism, however, did not easily allow people engaged in business to
enter into arbitrations or, even if they used arbitral procedures, to
control the flow of those procedures.
C. Changes in Mexican Arbitration Law
In recent years, various steps have been taken to modernize Mex-
ican arbitration law in order to allow parties privately to resolve dis-
putes. Each of these changes has constituted at least a partial step
away from the publicista model of arbitration.
1. THE CONVENTIONS
Mexico signed the New York Convention in 1971 and the Pan-
ama Convention in 1978.19 These two Conventions reflect the basic
tenets of consensual international commercial arbitration. The Con-
ventions require a signatory's courts to enforce agreements to arbi-
trate future disputes regardless of the form of the agreement and set
severe limits on the courts' rights to refuse to enforce an arbitration
award.50 Furthermore, the Panama Convention, in its only significant
difference with the New York Convention, provides in article 3: "In
the absence of an express agreement between the parties, the arbitra-
tion shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure of
the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission."'" The
IACAC utilizes the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules, which are a result of intense interna-
tional effort and consultation and are designed to honor the parties'
agreement to arbitrate and further the procedural flexibility that is
integral to efficient dispute resolution.52
The Conventions cannot be squared easily with article 14 of the
Mexican Constitution. The freedom to agree to arbitrate private dis-
putes allows parties to dispense with the procedural guarantees delin-
eated by the Constitution. The enforcement obligations require
Mexican courts to endorse awards which may have been obtained in
violation of the guarantees.53 Accordingly, the procedural guarantees
49. Jos6 L. Siqueiros, Mexico, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, app. 11-2 (Albert J. Van Den Berg ed., 1984).
50. Article 5 of the Panama Convention provides that enforcement of an arbitration award
may be refused on grounds of incapacity of the parties, inadequate notice, violation of
jurisdiction, or violation of the procedure established by agreement. Panama Convention,
supra note 2, at art. 5. The New York Convention has virtually identical provisions. See New
York Convention, supra note 1, at art. V.
51. Panama Convention, supra note 2, at art. 3.
52. See Norberg, supra note 18, at 90.
53. Although the Mexican Constitution provides that treaties constitute the supreme law
[Vol. 47:913
1993] MEXICAN ARBITRATION
of Mexican law even hobble the Conventions.
2. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF CONVENTION OBLIGATIONS
To date neither Mexican courts nor commentators have sug-
gested that courts will fully honor the provisions of the Conventions.
Three cases decided since Mexico first ratified the New York Conven-
tion, however, evidence Mexican courts' willingness to relax the tradi-
tional strictures on arbitration procedures and fully enforce the
Conventions.54
In 1977, in Presse Office S.A. v. Centro Editorial Hoy S.A. 5 and
Malden Mills, Inc. v. Hilaturas Lourdes S.A. ,56 Mexican courts
enforced arbitration awards over objections that the arbitrators
ignored constitutionally-mandated procedural formalities. In each
case, Mexican companies had participated freely in overseas arbitra-
tions pursuant to broad arbitration clauses-in the United States in
Malden Mills and in France in Presse Office-and resisted enforce-
ment after losing on the merits. In each case, the respondent claimed
neither that the award was manifestly unjust on the merits nor
obtained in violation of the parties' agreement. Instead, the respon-
dents claimed that discrepancies between the conduct of the arbitra-
tion and Mexican procedural guarantees precluded enforcement.
In Presse Office, the respondent stressed that a cardinal principle
of the land, the New York and Panama Conventions cannot override conflicting constitutional
provisions. Article 133 of the Constitution provides:
This Constitution, the laws of the Congress of the Union that emanate therefrom,
and all treaties that have been made and shall be made in accordance therewith
by the President of the Republic, with the approval of the Senate, shall be the
supreme law throughout the Union. The judges of each state shall conform to
the said Constitution, the laws, and treaties, notwithstanding any contradictory
provisions that may appear in the constitutions or laws of the States.
CONST. art. 133.
54. Professor Kurth offers a summary of the role of case law in the Mexican system:
It should be mentioned here that the common law rule of stare decisis has no
application in the civil law according to legal "folklore." Professors Bayitch and
Siqueiros have stated:
Legal rules applied by the Mexican courts in the process of disposing of
individual litigation (Yurisprudentia) have, as a matter of principle, no
authority as rules of law (precedents). According to an express provision in
the federal Civil Code (art. 19), the principle of stare decisis does not obtain
since civil controversies "shall be decided in accordance with the text of the
law (letra de la ley) or with its juristic interpretation (interpretacion juridica).
The authors go on to say that this does not preclude courts from being
impressed by references to earlier decisions, but they are not bound by
precedents.
Kurth, supra note 11, at 613-14 n.55 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
55. See 1979 Y.B. COM. ARB., VOL. IV, at 301.
56. See id. at 302.
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of Mexican public policy is that first notice of summons be personally
served on defendant.57 The respondent claimed that failure to do so,
despite his knowledge of and participation in the arbitration, rendered
the award unenforceable under Mexican law .5 The Court of First
Instance rejected this argument:
The arbitral procedure which resulted in the award ... complies
with the formal requirements imposed by Arts. 14 and 16 of the
Mexican Constitution and Article 619 of the [procedural code].
The summons, to which petitioner objects, was actually served in a
correct manner, because by inserting the arbitral clause in the con-
tract, the parties tacitly waived the formalities established by Mexi-
can procedural legislation, especially those required by Art. 605,
No. IV of the [procedural code] in respect of summons in per-
sonam .... 9
The Court of First Instance further rejected arguments that the award
had not been presented to the court with proper formality. The Court
noted that the New York Convention provided that the court in the
enforcing nation was empowered to examine the legality and authen-
ticity of the award.6'
In Malden Mills, the defendant also argued that the court should
not enforce the award because the defendant had not received per-
sonal service notifying him of the arbitration proceeding. 6' The Court
of First Instance accepted this argument and held in the defendant's
favor. 62 The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, concluding that
the Court of First Instance erred in failing to apply the New York
Convention, and dismissed claims by the defendant that the commer-
cial code should apply.63 The Court of Appeals also held that the
defendant waived procedural protections provided by Mexican law
and that the award did not have to be delivered through formal diplo-
matic channels. 64
Although article 14 of the Mexican Constitution and the pub-
licista theory of arbitration control the supporting reasoning, the deci-
sions ultimately vindicate the principles underlying the New York
Convention. Under the New York Convention, a party cannot resist
enforcement on the basis of lack of personal service where the party
57. Id. at 301.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 301-02 (footnotes omitted).
60. Id. at 302.
61. Id.






did receive notice and fully participated in the arbitration.65 Even
though both courts recognized that the New York Convention con-
trolled, the courts buttressed their conclusion by reasoning that the
parties waived the procedural requirements of the Mexican Constitu-
tion, which were satisfied nonetheless. This reasoning preserves-
albeit in a roundabout way-the vestiges of the supposedly super-
seded procedural protections. If parties waived or satisfied the proce-
dural protections, then it remains possible that in some circumstances
the protections apply.
A 1986 decision, Mitsui de Mexico S.A. and Mitsui & Co. Ltd. v.
Alkon Textil S.A. ,66 enforced the New York Convention without the
equivocation of Malden Mills or Presse Office. In Mitsui, the Court of
Appeals vacated a lower court's decision to take jurisdiction of a dis-
pute between two Japanese companies (collectively "Mitsui") and a
Mexican company ("Alkon"). 67 Mitsui and Alkon had entered into
seven contracts for the sale of machinery by Mitsui to Alkon.68 Each
contract included typical broad arbitration clauses providing substan-
tially that any dispute or disagreement which arises out of this con-
tract, or is related to this contract or the breach of this contract, and
which cannot be amicably settled without causing unnecessary delay
to the parties, will be referred to arbitration in Japan, under the law of
Japan and according to the rules of procedure of the Japan Commer-
cial Arbitration Association.69
In spite of this clause, Alkon instituted court proceedings against
Mitsui in which it sought restitution and damages for receipt of
machinery allegedly below an acceptable level of quality.
70 Mitsui
invoked the arbitration clause, but the judge in the Court of First
Instance held that it had jurisdiction and refused to refer the dispute
to arbitration in Japan.71
The reasoning of the Court of First Instance ran directly counter
to the New York Convention and the plain meaning of the arbitration
clauses. The court first held that only the rendering of an arbitration
award divested a court of jurisdiction.72 It next stunningly concluded
that Mitsui waived objections to its assumption of jurisdiction because
a dispute over the quality of the machinery did not fall within the
65. See supra note 50.
66. See 1991 Y.B. COM. ARB., VOL. XVI, at 594.
67. Id. at 598.
68. Id. at 594.
69. Id. at 595.
70. Id. at 595.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 596.
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meaning of the arbitration clauses. 7 The Court of First Instance also
concluded that Mitsui waived objections to its assumption of jurisdic-
tion by participating in the proceedings.74
The Court of Appeals reversed and sent the parties to Japan for
arbitration before the Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association
(JCAA).75 In a straight-forward manner, the Court of Appeals
applied the principles of the New York Convention. According to the
Court of Appeals, because the parties did not dispute authenticity of
the agreements, permitting the Court of First Instance to assume
jurisdiction would disserve the parties intentions:
Contracts validly concluded must be complied with faithfully(pacta sunt servanda) and their execution cannot be left to the will
of only one of the parties .... Since these contracts contain an
arbitration agreement, the [JCAA] has sole and exclusive jurisdic-
tion to decide the dispute, to the exclusion of any other jurisdic-
tional means and irrespective of the place of residence of the
defendants.76
As to the Court of First Instance's conclusion that the dispute
did not fall within the scope of the clauses, the Court of Appeals
noted that the dispute concerned defective machinery and reasoned:
The nature of the claims leaves no doubt that [Alkon] cannot val-
idly maintain-as was held in the decision a quo that the dispute
does not fall within the scope of the arbitration clauses ... because
the action is allegedly for damages. Further, claims 1 to 6,-
although [Alkon] does not mention this-concern the rescission of
the contracts for lack of performance, and only the last two claims
concern damages. Hence, [Alkon's] claim is related to or actually
derives from a typical contractual non-performance and it is not
extra contractual or independent from the contract, as the [lower
court judge] erroneously held.77
Mitsui provides a powerful and important decision that reflects a
real commitment to consensual commercial arbitration. The Court of
Appeals strongly affirmed the necessity for courts to enforce the par-
ties' expressed intentions even though the result, commanding a Mex-
ican company to go to Japan to fight a large Japanese company,
militated against strict enforcement of Convention obligations.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals lent important insight into
the treatment of arbitration clauses in Mexico. By holding that the
73. Id. at 597.
74. Id. at 597-98.
75. Id. at 598.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 597.
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broad arbitration clause covered "typical contractual non-perform-
ance," the Court of Appeals explicitly endorsed the validity of private
agreements to arbitrate future disputes. Finally, the Court of Appeals
approved of substantial arbitrator power when it concluded that the
arbitrators could address requests for contractual rescission. That
conclusion implied that the arbitral clause could be separated from
the remainder of the contract. This view of arbitral clauses, which
prevents excessive judicial interference in arbitrations, comprises part
of most modern arbitration regimes.78
3. REFORM OF THE FEDERAL COMMERCIAL CODE AND THE CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
The recent modifications to the commercial code and the proce-
dural code also sought to bring Mexican arbitration law in conformity
with the principles of the Conventions. 79 The reforms bifurcated the
commercial code provisions that address mercantile suits and, while
the old mercantile suit provisions remain, a separate section entitled
Arbitral Procedure now addresses private agreements to arbitrate
future disputes.8 0
The arbitral procedure section, a mix of new provisions and pro-
visions borrowed from the pre-reform procedural code, removed some
of the most troubling and burdensome provisions from the commer-
cial code. Article 1415 of the commercial code now recognizes the
right of the parties to submit future disputes to arbitration through a
private arbitration clause:
When the parties are merchants, they may agree to submit the con-
troversies arising from their commercial relationship to an arbitral
decision. The arbitral agreement may adopt the form of an arbitra-
tion clause to be included in a contract or in the form of a separate
agreement.
The arbitration agreement shall be in writing and may be evi-
denced by an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or by any other
similar means."1
78. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (holding
that arbitrator may address challenges to jurisdiction).
79. According to Dr. Siqueiros, title IV of the commercial code as amended "incorporates
principles embodied in the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, the 1958 New York Convention and the 1975 Inter-American (Panama)
Convention." Jos6 L. Siqueiros, Mexican National Update, 1990 Y.B. COM. ARB. 307.
80. C6d.Com. arts. 1415-1437 (the new commercial code provisions on arbitration).
81. C6d.Com. art. 1415. This is substantially the same language employed in the
Conventions. See Panama Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1 ("The agreement shall be set
forth in an instrument signed by the parties, or in the form of an exchange of letters, telegrams,
or telex communications."); New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2) ("The term
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Article 1421 of the commercial code provides that the agreed arbitra-
tion "may be domestic or international" and that "conventions and
international treaties" control over provisions of the commercial
code. 2
The reforms in the commercial code extend to the enforcement
of arbitration awards. Article 1347-A(I) of the commercial code
exempts arbitration awards from foreign transmittal requirements
and removes personal service of the defendant during the arbitration
as a prerequisite to enforcement. The defendant simply must have
"been summoned or subpoenaed in due legal form in order to guaran-
tee him due process of law and the opportunity to present his
defenses."8 3
The procedural code's provisions regarding arbitral suits remain
largely unchanged. The procedural code still does not make any
direct reference to international arbitration or arbitral institutions.
Furthermore, the provisions do not clearly establish either the possi-
bility of submitting future disputes to arbitration or the relative free-
dom of the parties to establish their own procedure. Moreover, the
laundry list of procedural controls remains in place."4 Thus, the cur-
rent procedural code preserves the pre-existing preference for proce-
dural formality.
D. Mexico Has a Complete Arbitration Framework
Reforms of the commercial and procedural codes represent a sig-
nificant advance. A company contemplating commercial transactions
in Mexico or with a Mexican company now may enter into an arbitral
agreement in reliance upon an established body of law.
The commercial code now recognizes informal agreements to
arbitrate future disputes, a recognition found formerly, if at all, in the
procedural code. 5 The reformed commercial code expressly recog-
nizes international arbitration and Mexican courts' obligation to
enforce the New York and Panama Conventions. Mitsui, Presse
.agreement in writing' shall include an arbitral clause ... or ... an exchange of letters and
telegrams.").
82. See C6d.Com. art. 1421 (The arbitration may be domestic or international; the
provisions of the Code shall apply to both sides, with the exception of what has been provided
for by the conventions and international treaties to which Mexico is a party.).
83. C6d.Com. art. 1347-A(IV).
84. As discussed infra part III.D., an entirely new procedure for the confirmation of
foreign awards was added to a section of the procedural code.
85. C6d.Com. art. 1050 (establishing the primacy of the commercial code: "When
pursuant to commercial law, one of the parties ... deems the transaction as one of mercantile
nature and the other party deems it as one of civil nature, the dispute arising therefrom shall be
governed by commercial laws.").
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Office, and Malden Mill indicate that Mexican courts will enforce
those obligations. Additionally, some of the most onerous provisions
of the commercial code have been eliminated, thereby removing some
potential conflicts between Mexico's obligations arising under the
Conventions and the procedural restrictions that arguably rest on
constitutional guarantees.
III. THE CONTINUING LINK BETWEEN MEXICAN ARBITRATION
LAW AND THE PUBLICISTA THEORY OF ARBITRATION
Despite these tangible advances, rightly praised by commenta-
86tors, a careful analysis of the reforms reveals that the pre-existing
publicista framework limits them. All facets of arbitration in Mexico,
including recognition of the arbitral clause and arbitral procedure and
enforcement of arbitration awards, remain subject to heavy govern-
ment control. Mexican arbitration law is not as cumbersome as
before, but the remaining procedural controls seriously retard the util-
ity of international arbitration in Mexico or with Mexican
companies.8 7
86. Eg., Hoagland, supra note 5, at 91 ("These domestic reforms continue Mexico's role
as a Latin American leader, begun in a major way by acceptance of the Convention of the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of New York (New York
Convention) in 1971-and in the movement of systematization of private international law.").
87. The provisions of the new commercial code may not be dismissed as simply the result
of poor drafting or sheer thoughtlessness. While many provisions of the 1988 commercial code
were simply borrowed from the pre-reform procedural code, other provisions of the reformed
commercial code are entirely new. Even the borrowed provisions have been re-drafted in part,
although the procedural controls remain unchanged or even enhanced.
For example, article 619 of the current procedural code provides that unless the parties
expressly disclaim procedural formalities, established judicial formalities guide the arbitration.
C.P.C.D.F. art. 619. Article 1422 of the current commercial code provides that the parties
may enter into any stipulation regarding arbitration procedure that does not impinge upon the
due process minimum. C.P.C.D.F. art. 1422. Article 1338 of the procedural code, by
contrast, required the arbitrators to hear all offered proofs and allegations except what was
otherwise stipulated by the parties. C.P.C.D.F. art. 1338 (1884).
The drafters also directly granted the arbitrators discretion when such control did not
affect arbitration procedure, but the substantive law applied during arbitration. Article 1426
of the commercial code, for example, provides:
The parties may choose the law applicable to the merits of the dispute, unless
such choice would not be valid on grounds of public policy. In the absence of
such choice or when the latter is not legally valid, the arbitrator or the arbitral
tribunal, having regard to the characteristics and connections of the case, will
determine the applicable laws as to the merits.
C6d.Com. art. 1426 (emphasis added). See also C.P.C.D.F. art. 608 (court enforcing arbitra-
tion award may not examine the merits of the judgment).
Moreover, the reformers clearly had at their disposal alternative, less restrictive, provi-
sions. In the 1960s, for example, the Internal Rules for the Permanent Commission on Arbi-
tration of the National Chamber of Commerce of Mexico City provided that the Commission
had the discretionary power to control arbitration procedure in the absence of a contrary
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A. The Arbitration Clause
Although the commercial code now recognizes agreements to
arbitrate future disputes and Mitsui gave typical arbitration clauses a
broad interpretation, the reforms imported from the procedural code
limit the utility of those advances. 8 Article 1417 of the commercial
code provides:
The arbitral agreement should designate the matters which shall be
submitted to the arbitral proceedings as well as the name of the
arbitrator or arbitrators; otherwise the procedure to be followed
for their designation. If there is no mention regarding the subject
matter of the arbitration agreement the latter should be considered
null and void without [judicial intervention].8 9
A general agreement to arbitrate future disputes, the touchstone
of arbitration, may not sufficiently specify the matters to be submitted
to arbitration. Because a violation of this provision renders an agree-
ment "null and void without judicial intervention," a party resisting
arbitration has colorable grounds for a flat refusal to arbitrate.90
Thus, the reforms leave unsettled possibly the most basic issue con-
cerning an arbitration scheme-the enforceability of the arbitration
clause.91
Just as important, article 1417 of the commercial code reflects
the code's aversion to granting arbitrators power even with the con-
currence of the parties. Accepted arbitration norms, reflected in the
seminal U.S. case Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufactur-
ing Co.,92 hold that the arbitration clause can be separated from the
remainder of the contract. Pursuant to this separability doctrine,
arbitrators may address challenges to their own jurisdiction, even
where the parties dispute the formation of the underlying contract.
In contrast, article 1417 of the commercial code provides that an
agreement and that parties waived all rights to challenge those decisions. Siqueiros, supra note
15, at 721-22, app. a.
88. See supra notes 41-44.
89. C6d.Com. art. 1417 (emphasis added).
90. The procedural code may not be used to avoid this limiting provision because article
616 of the procedural code retains the prior command that "It]he submission shall indicate the
matter or matters to be arbitrated .... If the first element is lacking, the submission shall be
null and void without the need of previous judicial declaration." Note that the phrasing of this
older provision slightly differs from the provision included in the revised commercial code.
This change suggests that the drafters tried to improve this provision and that its inclusion in
the new commercial code was not a mistake or an oversight.
91. Cf. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, U.N.
Sales No. E.77.V.6 (1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL RULES] ("Where the parties to a contract
have agreed in writing that disputes in relation to that contract shall be referred to arbitration
... then such disputes shall be settled [by arbitration].") (footnote omitted).
92. 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967).
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arbitration clause is automatically null and void where there is no
mention of the subject matter of the arbitration in the arbitral agree-
ment. Thus, by definition, jurisdictional issues centering on the speci-
ficity of the clause may not be addressed by the arbitrators. Article
1051 of the commercial code indicates that courts should address
challenges to the arbitrability of a dispute by delineating the method
of bringing jurisdictional challenges before the court. "The illegality
of the agreement or its non-observance when the agreement is made in
accordance to law may be claimed at any time previous to the render-
ing of the award or judgment through a summary motion without
stay of proceedings. ' 93 Article 1051 thus prevents an arbitrator from
considering jurisdictional claims when the claim is based upon fraud
or other type of illegality.
Article 1434 of the commercial code and article 630 of the proce-
dural code arguably grant power to the arbitrators to address other
jurisdictional issues, such as whether a dispute falls within the ambit
of a sufficiently specific, admittedly valid, arbitration clause. Articles
1434 of the commercial code provides that "[iln the course of the
proceedings the arbitrators may resolve any incidental issues that
must be decided prior to the principal subject matter."' 94 However,
when this provision was first drafted in the 19th century, separate
provisions dealt with the power of arbitrators to address jurisdictional
issues.9' Thus, the historical context does not permit an expansive
interpretation that would bring the commercial code in line with
modem arbitration schemes.
Of course, a court could sweep away these questions. The Con-
ventions arguably override any barriers to the enforcement of an arbi-
tration clause.9 6  Moreover, Mitsui apparently recognized the
separability of the arbitration clause and the power of arbitrators to
93. C6d.Com. art. 1051.
94. C6d.Com. art 1434; see also C.P.C.D.F. art. 630 (similar language).
95. See Trevino, supra note 7, at 332 (in pre-reform arbitration scheme the court may
address the competence of arbitrators, the validity of the agreement, or the arbitrability of the
dispute). Additionally, the ancient provisions outlining the power of arbitrators to rule on
their own jurisdiction were confusing and contradictory. Compare C.P.C.D.F. ch. V, § 1, art.
1245 (1884) (the nullity of the arbitration clause may only be presented to the arbitrators
before answering the initial demand) and C.P.C.D.F. ch. V, § 4, art. 1300 (1884) (the
arbitrators may not address validity of their appointment or the arbitral submission) with
C.P.C.D.F. ch. V, § 4, art. 1249 (1884) (the arbitrators may address incidental matters without
resolution of which they could not decide the principal dispute).
96. New York Convention, supra note 1, at art. II, § 1 ("Each Contracting State shall
recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration
all or any differences which have arisen or may arise between them in respect of a defined legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration."); Panama Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1 (similar language).
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rule on their own jurisdiction when it held that arbitrators could
address claims of contractual recision. However, these reforms to the
commercial code were made after Mitsui, and thus they could be
understood as rejecting the separability of arbitration clauses and the
power of arbitrators to rule on their own jurisdiction.
B. Formality of Arbitration Procedure
Even assuming that an arbitration clause is honored, the com-
mercial code's commitment to honoring the parties' agreement to
arbitrate disputes pursuant to agreement may be illusory. Each of the
provisions in the commercial code that honor the agreement-articles
1051, 1421-23-maintains the role of procedural regularity that char-
acterizes prior Mexican arbitration law.
Article 1051 of the commercial code establishes that the parties
lack absolute freedom to agree on procedural issues: "Within the lim-
itations established by this Book, the overall preferred procedure shall
be that freely agreed by the parties . . . ."I Article 1422 of the com-
mercial code sets out the critical limitation on arbitration procedure
drawn from the fundamental guarantees in the Constitution: "In the
arbitration agreement the parties may freely agree as to the rules of
procedure to be followed provided due process requirements are com-
plied with."9 These provisions unambiguously mean that arbitrations
must contain a minimum "due process" level of procedural protec-
tion, despite any contrary agreement by the parties.99 The commer-
cial and procedural codes do not define the basic elements of the
prescribed due process, but these elements may reasonably include
97. C6d.Com. art 1051 (emphasis added).
98. C6d.Com. art 1422 (emphasis added). Through a public document merchants may
still engage in a mercantile suit that preserves the essential element of court procedure. These
provisions do not directly apply to arbitral suits. Article 1051 of the commercial code provides
that title IV of Book V, Arbitral Procedure, articles 1415-1437 in the commercial code,
expressly controls agreements to arbitrate future disputes. C6d.Com. art. 1051. The
continued existence of these arguably useless provisions, however, illustrates continued
emphasis on procedural regularity.
99. I use the phrase "due process" because Dr. Siqueiros used this phrase in his
presentation of the commercial code. See Siqueiros, supra note 15. The Spanish phrase "las
formalidades esenciales del procidimiento" may be translated literally as "the essential
formalities of procedure" and has a different technical meaning than United States' due
process. See also C6d.Com. art. 1421 (reaffirming limitations set out in article 1051 by stating
"lacking an express agreement of the parties . . . in accordance with the provisions of the
following articles, the rules of this Code shall be governing; in their absence, those rules
established by the [local] Code of Civil Procedure . . . shall govern.") (emphasis added);
C6d.Com. art. 1423 ("In the arbitration agreement the parties may agree as to: . . . V. Any
other stipulation which they may deem convenient, . . . without prejudice to the provisions




personal service, formal pleadings, a reasoned opinion addressing all
matter submitted, and other guarantees of the procedural code tradi-
tionally incorporated into Mexican arbitration procedure. "
The procedural controls over commercial arbitration extend
beyond the requirement that a minimum level of due process be pre-
served. Commercial code article 1421 retains the "bootstrap"
provision:
If the arbitration proceedings are to take place in Mexico, lacking
an express agreement of the parties or an express provision of the
rules of procedure agreed to by such parties in accordance with the
provisions of the following articles, the rules of this Code shall be
governing; in their absence, those rules established by the [local]
Code of Civil Procedure.
Not only does this provision import all the procedural formalities of
Mexican courts not addressed by the agreed procedure, it also imports
article 619 of the procedural code, another "bootstrap" provision,
which places the burden on the parties to disclaim particular formal
procedures:
During the proceedings the parties and the arbitrators shall follow
the terms and formalities established by the courts, unless the par-
ties have agreed otherwise. However, regardless of what the parties
have agreed to, the arbitrators shall always be obliged to receive
evidence and hear pleadings if so required by any of the parties.
Through article 1421 of the commercial code the challenging
party may invoke article 619 of the procedural code and claim that
normal rules of procedure control the arbitration if not specifically
disclaimed.10' Perhaps, if article 133 of the Constitution permits, the
New York and Panama Conventions override these requirements.
Although the Conventions do not expressly prohibit a host country
from exerting control over arbitral procedure, article 111(3) of the
New York Convention commands a court to refer a dispute within
the scope of an arbitration clause to arbitration unless it finds that the
agreement is "null and void, inoperative or incapable of being per-
formed."10 2 Similarly, article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention
suggests that the parties' agreed procedure always prevails over pre-
100. See also C.P.C.D.F. art. 619 (emphasis added):
During the proceedings the parties and arbitrators shall follow the terms and
formalities established by the courts, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.
However, regardless of what the parties have agreed to, the arbitrators shall
always be obliged to receive evidence and hear pleadings if so required by any of
the parties.
101. This argument may appear strained, but trial courts accepted weaker arguments in
Mitsui and Malden Mills. See supra part II.C.2.
102. New York Convention, supra note 1, at art. 111(3).
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scribed domestic procedure and allows for refusing enforcement only
if "the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement
of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with
the law of the country where the arbitration took place .... ,,o3 On
the other hand, the Conventions cannot prevail over the contrary dic-
tates of article 14 of the Mexican Constitution.
C. Non-Due Process Procedural Controls
The commercial and procedural codes control arbitral proce-
dure, apart from the due process requirements, with a list of
mandatory and default procedural rules that apply to all arbitrations.
While these provisions are arguably subject to nullification under the
Conventions if the parties attempt to contract otherwise, they were
included in the commercial code after Mexico ratified the Conven-
tions and thus, at least, raise the possibility that a Mexican court
would enforce them. Moreover, if the parties do not explicitly dis-
claim these procedures, even a generous interpretation of the Conven-
tions might not prevent their application. Accordingly, the provisions
create a substantial risk that parties to an arbitration will struggle
through unanticipated procedural hurdles.
1. APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT
Tucked away at the end of article 1428 of the commercial code is
a new provision governing control of settlement.l10 That article delin-
eates the circumstances terminating an arbitration:
If the parties reach a settlement as to the merits of the dispute the
arbitrator shall proceed to close the proceedings; if the arbitrator
finds that the terms of the settlement are not contrary to public pol-
icy [orden publico], the arbitrator should approve the settlement
and record it in the form of a final award."15
By definition, this control over settlement cannot be waived. It
103. Panama Convention, supra note 2, at art. 5(l)(d); see also id. at arts. 1, 3, 5(2)(b). In
any event, a Mexican court could resist enforcement of an award on the grounds that it was
contrary to public policy under the authority of article 5(2)(e) of the New York Convention.
While the public policy exception to mandatory enforcement is normally narrowly construed,
it could readily encompasses the fundamental guarantees of Mexican procedure found in the
Constitution. See also Panama Convention, supra note 2, at art. 5(d).
104. Commercial code article 1428 closely copies the long-standing provision in article 622
of the procedural code that describes the conditions upon which the submission to arbitrate
terminates. C6d.Com. art. 1428; C.P.C.D.F. art. 622. No prior version of this clause
addresses settlement issues. The reformers, therefore, made a deliberate decision to limit the
parties' ability to settle their own cases.
105. C6d.Com. art. 1428 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 47:913
MEXICAN ARBITRA TION
addresses precisely those situations in which the parties have reached
agreement contrary to the arbitrator's judgment.
This clause potentially constitutes an unheard of intrusion into
the freedom of parties to arbitrate commercial disputes. A Mexican
tribunal might find a way to control such an intrusive arbitrator
because the results run counter to dictates of the Conventions and
because the Constitution nowhere endorses shifting power from liti-
gants to arbitrators. Nevertheless, because this provision apparently
represents such a sharp and unprecedented intrusion into arbitral
freedom, its presence alone is a serious hindrance to the arbitration
process. 06
2. CHALLENGE TO ARBITRATORS
The revised commercial code limits the parties' power to chal-
lenge arbitrators. The commercial code reforms imported ancient
provisions from the procedural code that limited the grounds for arbi-
trator challenge and removed the power of the arbitrators to consider
such challenges.107 Articles 1420 and 1428(111) of the commercial
code, copies of present procedural code articles 618 and 622(111),
establish that once the parties consent to an arbitrator, that arbitrator
has immunity from challenge.'0° Because commercial code article
1418 provides for court-appointed arbitrators when the agreement
does not name the arbitrators or identify the procedure for appointing
the arbitrator, arbitrators arguably have immunity from challenge if
the parties have agreed to their appointment or the procedure for
their appointment. 0 9
Even if this argument failed, the grounds for challenge remain
extraordinarily limited. According to commercial code article 1433
106. The arbitrator's interference could upset a settlement, even if ultimately unenforceable.
If one of the parties settles reluctantly, the initial refusal to endorse a settlement could
encourage withdrawal from the settlement.
107. Consistent with this provision, the arbitrators may be without legal capacity to
disqualify themselves. Commercial code article 1433 provides that challenges regarding
arbitrators be decided by the court of common jurisdiction. C6d.Com. art. 1433. Procedural
code article 633 generally confirms that authority. C.P.C.D.F. art. 633. Article 1428 of the
commercial code, in turn, grants arbitrators the power to withdraw only for reasons of
personal incapacity: "II. By the withdrawal of the designated arbitrator or arbitrators, which
may only be with justified cause making them unable to perform their duties .... " C6d.Com.
art. 1428 (emphasis added).
Together, the provisions on challenge and withdrawal suggest a startling result. In any
arbitration other than one with a court-appointed arbitrator, both the parties and the
arbitrators may lack capacity to respond to even blatant and newly-discovered arbitrator bias.
108. C6d.Com. arts. 1420, 1428 (III); C.P.C.D.F. arts. 618, 622 (III).
109. See C.P.C.D.F. art. 622 (limiting personal disqualification only to cases of verified
illness).
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and procedural code article 623, "the arbitrators may only be chal-
lenged [in court] on the same grounds applicable to judges."'1 0
Titulo Cuarto, De Los Impedimientos, Recusaciones y Excusas
sets out in six chapters and twenty-three articles the basis and proce-
dure for judicial challenge and removal."' Not only is this body of
law too complex to serve as a ready guide for foreign businesspersons
as to the appropriateness of an arbitrator, its standards are inappro-
priate for an arbitration. Procedural code article 170 provides, for
example, that judges may not serve:
I. On cases in which [the judge] has a direct or indirect interest;
V. When the judge, his/her spouse, or their children is an heir,
legatee, donor, donee, partner, creditor, debtor, guarantor, recipi-
ent of a guarantee, landlord, lessor, principal, agent, or social
acquaintance of one of the parties... ;
VI. If the judge has made promises or threats, or has shown in
any other way his/her hatred or affection for one of the litigants
112
These standards are both too broad and too narrow. They may
well mandate the recusal of persons within a particular industry, even
though such persons are best suited for resolving the particular dis-
pute. On the other hand, the recusal provisions treat arbitrators as
professional decisionmakers who are presumptively impartial absent
an outward display of bias. These mandated standards also falter
because they do not provide for disclosure and do not classify failure
to disclose as an additional reason for recusal.
3. LIMITATIONS ON PROOF AND PROCEDURE
Article 1424 of the procedural code provides that the "arbitra-
tors shall always be obliged to receive evidence and hear pleadings if
so required by any of the parties; any agreement to the contrary will
be null and void."" 3 Commercial code article 1423 prevents parties
from agreeing on the methods of presenting evidence outside of the
due process framework." 4 These two provisions arguably return
Mexican law to the now-expunged requirement of the pre-reform
codes that the parties could not relinquish methods of proof. More-
over, an arbitrator who seeks to control a seemingly endless flow of
pleadings and evidence, used solely to burden the opposing party,
110. C6d.Com. art. 1433; C.P.C.D.F. art. 623.
111. C.P.C.D.F. arts. 170-90.
112. C.P.C.D.F. art. 170.
113. C.P.C.D.F. art. 1424.
114. C6d.Com. art. 1423.
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may have no legal power to do so. Of course, a host of legal fictions-
for example, that the evidence is duplicative and thus not covered by
commercial code article 1423-might support a contrary result. Nev-
ertheless, these provisions produce needless uncertainty.
4. TIME LIMITS
Article 1419 of the commercial code provides: "The arbitration
agreement will be valid although no time limit has been fixed for the
conclusion of the arbitral proceedings; such being the case the arbitra-
tor's mission shall last sixty working days. The term is to be reckoned
as of the start of the arbitration proceedings." '1 5 This small provision
could fatally wound arbitration rights. According to its terms, unless
the parties specify a time-period, the arbitration ends in sixty days.
Accordingly, in a complex matter where the parties did not spec-
ify a time period the defendant could extract a favorable settlement by
refusing to agree to an extension of this limited period. A plaintiff
would then have to choose between: (1) agreeing to the unfavorable
settlement; (2) completing presentation of the case within sixty days;
or (3) attempting to continue the case past sixty days with the hope
that Mexican courts would not strictly enforce the limit. 16 This
default provision serves no public policy, other than a generalized
reluctance to permit arbitrators to control arbitrations." 7
5. SUBSTITUTION OF ARBITRATORS
Commercial code article 1428(I)-(III) places limits on the
replacement of arbitrators depending upon the reason for replace-
ment--death, justified withdrawal, or justified challenge. Commercial
code article 1428(I) provides that if the "arbitrator '" 8 dies, the arbi-
tration ends unless the parties designated a substitute or procedure for
replacement beforehand or the parties agree to a new arbitrator
within thirty days.'1 9 If the court appointed the arbitrator, the court
is to follow the same procedure originally used. According to com-
mercial code article 1428(11), if the "arbitrator" withdraws for a per-
115. C6d.Com. art. 1419; see also id. art. 1428 (V) (arbitration expires without express
agreement to extend time limits); C.P.C.D.F. art. 617 (1988) (identical to C6d.Com. art. 1419).
116. C6d.Com. art. 1419. This provision is even susceptible to the assertion that the
opinion must be issued within sixty days.
117. Interestingly, the 1884 procedural code did not appear to require that the passage of
the set term for an arbitration preclude an award. Procedural code article 1296 allowed the
arbitrators to ask the parties for additional time, and procedural code article 1297 held them
responsible for any damages if they did not ask for permission in time. These provisions imply
that any such delayed award still would have been valid.
118. See infra note 144.
119. C6d.Com. art. 1428(I).
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missible reason, illness for example, the parties must agree on a new
arbitrator within thirty days or the arbitration ends.121 If a court-
appointed arbitrator withdraws for a justified cause, the court must
make a second appointment. If the court-appointed substitute arbi-
trator resigns for a justified cause, the arbitration then ends. Addi-
tionally, under 1428(111), the arbitration ends when a court-appointed
arbitrator has been successfully challenged for a second time.' 21
These complex procedures, the result of tremendous distrust
shown toward litigants and arbitrators, produce enormous confusion
in those areas not directly addressed by the agreement. If an arbitra-
tor's resignation is not justified, when does the arbitration end? May
the parties address the replacement of a court-appointed arbitrator in
their arbitration clause? Do these procedures apply when one of three
arbitrators resigns, withdraws, or is challenged? May two arbitrators
continue with or without a replacement when a third arbitrator with-
draws or is challenged? Do circumstances exist in which the arbitra-
tors should start over? The commercial code and procedural codes do
not provide answers to these questions.
D. Enforcement of Foreign Awards
The new procedures for enforcement of foreign awards appear to
de-emphasize procedural regularity. Article 1347-A(I) of the com-
mercial code specifically exempts arbitral awards from the require-
ment that foreign judgments be formally transmitted to the Mexican
court and that the defendant receive personal service, thus apparently
eliminating the previously existing barriers to rapid enforcement of
arbitration awards. 22
Commercial code article 1437 also provides, however, that
enforcement is governed by the local code of procedure. Article 606
of the procedural code maintains the same restrictions that previously
existed including: the judgment satisfies the necessary formalities for
transmission; 23 the arbitration is not an action concerning real prop-
erty; the judge or arbitrator was competent to address the matter
under accepted international principles compatible with the principles
of Mexican Civil Procedure; the defendant received personal service
in order to ensure the guarantees of a hearing and an opportunity to
120. Id. at art. 1428(11).
121. Id. at art. 1428(111).
122. Id. at art. 1347-A(I).
123. Pursuant to revised article 1347 of the commercial code, no such formalities are
required. C6d.Com. art. 1347.
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present his defenses;1 24 the matter is not pending in Mexico; the
award has the character of resjudicata in the country in which it was
issued, and no right to ordinary appeal exists; the underlying obliga-
tion is not contrary to Mexican public policy; and the judgment is
authentic. 125
The reformed procedural code also includes new reasons to deny
enforcement. The judge has the discretion to deny enforcement if the
country from which the award arose does not recognize foreign arbi-
tral awards. 26 Procedural code article 605 also prohibits enforce-
ment of awards contrary to the "public policy" of the Federal Code of
Civil Procedure and other applicable laws, except to the extent a
treaty controls.12
7
Article 608 of the procedural code establishes a procedure, homo-
logacidn, to determine whether the award may be enforced. Article
608 provides that homologacidn starts with personal service upon the
defendant. The defendant subsequently has nine working days to
respond and present appropriate defenses. If the defendant has
appropriate proof, a date will be set for admission of this proof. Fur-
ther, the Public Ministry always has the right to intervene to exercise
its rights. In all cases, the judge's resolution of the defendant's proof
is subject to appeal. 28
The homologacidn procedure presents problems. Most troubling
is the requirement that the defendant receive personal service to start
the procedure. A defendant who has already lost an arbitration and
knows that enforcement will be stayed until personal service may seek
to avoid service. Moreover, the public policy exception, the reference
to "proof," and the potential intervention of the Public Minister sug-
gest an extremely wide-ranging hearing.
Not surprisingly, the two leading commentators on Mexican
arbitration again sharply disagree over the nature of this hearing. Dr.
Siqueiros argues that homologacidn should be understood as the inter-
nationally-recognized procedure of exequatur, a simple process
devoted largely to determining the authenticity of the award. Dr.
Sierra, by contrast, believes that the homologacidn hearing potentially
provides a forum for re-examination of the merits of the award as well
124. Arguably, the personal service requirement is softened because it exists to promote the
desired result, a fair hearing, rather than being an end in itself.
125. C.P.C.D.F. art. 606.
126. Mexico did not take this reservation in either the New York or Panama conventions,
and thus the Mexican courts should ignore this provision pursuant to the supremacy
provisions of article 133 of the Constitution.
127. C.P.C.D.F. art. 605.
128. Id. at art. 608.
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as an opportunity for delay and chicanery. 129
The unknown scope of other methods of challenging arbitration
awards adds to the confusion concerning the nature of homologacidn.
Article 1423(IV) of the commercial code provides that parties may
waive the right of "appeal," and article 635 of the procedural code
provides for an appeal pursuant to the "applicable procedural
laws." 1 3' By contrast, procedural code article 608(IV) absolutely for-
bids a re-examination of the merits of an arbitration award.1 3' Thus,
Dr. Siqueiros argues that the "appeal" referred to in the codes is sim-
ply the right to resist enforcement. 32 However, a party cannot waive
the right to resist enforcement, and Dr. Siqueiros' explanation cannot
fully account for the various references to the right of appeal in the
commercial and procedural codes.
Amparo, the great writ of Mexico, affords relief from violations
of constitutional protections and may also be used to resist enforce-
ment of arbitration awards. 3 3 The commercial and procedural codes
leave undefined how amparo should apply and how it differs from the
right of a court to refuse enforcement of a foreign award contrary to
Mexican public policy under the procedural code.
Mexican courts might override any right to challenge enforce-
ment of an arbitration award on procedural grounds pursuant to the
Conventions. The Conventions, however, allow a signatory to refuse
enforcement on the grounds that the award violates public policy.1 34
While this exception normally is construed narrowly, the inclusion of
the various procedural and public policy protections in the commer-
cial and procedural codes after Mexico signed the Conventions might
well persuade a court to accept an argument that it should broadly
construe the public policy exception.
129. Hoagland, supra note 5, at 98 (citations omitted).
130. C6d.Com. art. 1423(IV); C.P.C.D.F. art. 635.
131. C.P.C.D.F. art. 608.
132. In his annotated translation of the commercial code reforms, Dr. Siqueiros argues that
the references to an appeal are best "understood as a recourse filed by either party against the
enforcement of the award ...." Siqueiros, supra note 49, at app. 11-5.
133. Articles 105 and 107 of the Mexican Constitution provide that the Federal Courts may
remedy violation of "individual guarantees" through a trial in amparo. Article 635 of the
commercial code directly applies amparo to "an arbitrator appointed by the court." C6d.Com.
art. 635. It may apply in other circumstances as well. The nature and application of amparo is
an enormously complicated topic outside the scope and expertise of this article.
134. New York Convention, supra note I, at art. V(2)(b); Panama Convention, supra note
2, at art. 5.
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E. The Arbitration Reforms Are Not Harmonized with the
UNCITRAL Rules
The easy response to the litany of problems described above is
that while the codes raise serious potential issues, the structure of
Mexico's international obligations makes such outcomes unlikely for
arbitrations that involve residents of countries such as the United
States. The well-drafted UNCITRAL rules apply by default to arbi-
trations between residents of signatories to the Panama Convention,
such as the United States. 35 Unfortunately, the UNCITRAL rules
conflict with the procedural controls of the commercial code and do
not find an easy conceptual resting place along side the "bootstrap"
and "due process" provisions. As such, the default application of
these rules only highlights the problems created by the procedural
controls on Mexican arbitration.
The commercial code specifically recognizes the utility of arbitral
institutions and their rules. Article 1422 provides:
In the arbitration agreement the parties may freely agree as to the
rules of procedure to be followed provided due process require-
ments are complied with. Likewise, they may agree that the arbi-
tration will be governed by the rules approved of or used by
professional institutions which administer arbitral proceedings. 13 6
The commercial code does not, however, explain the relationship
between the UNCITRAL rules and the mandatory provisions of the
two codes.
Under article 133 of the Mexican Constitution, the UNCITRAL
rules arguably trump the commercial code because they are provided
for in the Panama Convention. The UNCITRAL Rules, however,
expressly defer to mandatory local procedural provisions. a13  Thus,
the relevant texts leave undefined the power of the UNCITRAL rules
to control over contrary commercial code and procedural code provi-
sions. Moreover, if the UNCITRAL rules cannot completely over-
ride contrary code procedures, the extent of the conflict is unclear.
The UNCITRAL rules grant the arbitrators power to address unan-
ticipated disputes, but the "bootstrap" provisions of the two codes
provide that such disputes be resolved with reference to court rules.
The commercial and procedural codes do not state whether the
135. Panama Convention, supra note 2, at art. 3.
136. C6d.Com. art. 1422.
137. UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 91, at art. 1(2) ("These Rules shall govern the
arbitration except that where any of these Rules is in conflict with a provision of the law
applicable to the arbitration from which the parties cannot derogate, that provision shall
prevail.").
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UNCITRAL rules preempt the field and displace the "bootstrap"
provisions. 1 38
Furthermore, many provisions of the UNCITRAL rules actually
conflict with the commercial and procedural codes. Article 1 of the
rules places no specific limitation on the arbitration clause, and article
21 clearly spells out the power of the arbitration panel to rule on its
own jurisdiction. The two codes, however, place restrictions on the
content of the arbitration clause and the power of the arbitrators to
address its meaning.1 39
The UNCITRAL rules also grant to the parties and the arbitra-
tors procedural freedom that conflicts with the due process require-
ments of the commercial code. Article 15 allows the arbitral tribunal,
within the framework of the rules, to "conduct the arbitration in such
manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are
treated with equality and that at any stage in the proceedings each
party is given a full opportunity of presenting his case." In that vein,
the arbitrators, the parties, or both can limit the procedural frame-
work. Article 22, for example, allows the parties to decide what
pleadings, other than the statement of claim and defense, "shall be
required." Further, the parties are entitled, under article 30, to waive
their right to object to any procedure simply by proceeding in spite of
a known irregularity.
The UNCITRAL rules also conflict with mandatory commercial
and procedural code provisions that address matters such as settle-
ment and arbitral challenge. Under the rules, the arbitrators have no
authority to refuse to enter a settlement as a judgment."4 Arbitral
challenge is based upon a flexible standard that permits challenges
under "circumstances ... that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the
arbitrator's impartiality or independence," and a challenge is first a
matter for the arbitrators. 141 Moreover, simply because a party
agreed to the appointment of an arbitrator does not bar a challenge if
the party did not initially realize the reason for the challenge. Those
procedures cannot be reconciled with the controls over these same
138. Commercial code article 1422 may be read as exempting organizational rules from due
process requirements-the first sentence refers to due process and the second sentence
endorses arbitral institutions. C6d.Com. art. 1442. However, the reference to the rules of
professional arbitral institutions is not contained in a separate section, nor do the references to
mandatory procedures exempt the rules of arbitral institutions. Moreover, such an exemption,
without further definition, makes no sense. While it might be rational to conclude that
established arbitral institutions will preserve litigants' rights in the absence of due process
mandates, such an assumption is irrational unless the type of organization is further defined.
139. See, e.g., C6d.Com. arts. 1417, 1434; supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.




matters in the commercial code and the procedural code.142
Application of the UNCITRAL rules prevents some potential
problems. For example, UNCITRAL article 23 gives the arbitral tri-
bunal the power to fix time limits. A fair, although not the sole, read-
ing of this article indicates that such a delegation is proper and avoids
automatic termination at the end of a sixty-day period. Similarly, the
procedures that apply when arbitrators are not appointed by consent
of the parties have little significance in light of UNCITRAL articles
6-8 and 13-14 which provide for the appointment of arbitrators. Even
the application of the UNCITRAL rules, however, cannot remove the
risk and uncertainty arising from Mexican arbitration law.
IV. THE STATE OF MEXICAN ARBITRATION
This Article's careful parsing of the commercial code and proce-
dural code may unfairly paint Mexican arbitration reform as a failure.
Many commercial code and procedural code provisions comport with
modem arbitration theory, such as the procedural code's absolute bar
of the evaluation of the merits of an award, and other provisions are
subject to interpretation consistent with those norms. 4 3 The three
published cases show that Mexican courts will, in fact, use the Con-
ventions as a tool to smooth out rough edges in the two codes. Addi-
tionally, the drafters may have believed that any additional changes in
the Mexican arbitration regime would have led courts to nullify all
reform or the business community to reject private dispute resolution.
Nevertheless, the presence of potential problems may destroy
any possibility of real growth in international arbitration with Mexi-
can companies because successful arbitration regimes limit uncer-
tainty and risk. Moreover, the Mexican courts' hesitancy to reject
frivolous arguments, revealed in the published cases, and the deliber-
ate decision of the reformers to preserve procedural restrictions in the
142. This article does not fully explore potential conflicts between the UNCITRAL Rules
and Mexican law. For example, the procedural controls in the Mexican arbitration procedure
extend to the form of the award. The procedural code requires that tribunals address all
matters before them and provide reasons for their decisions. While neither the commercial
code nor the procedural code require such reasoning, the guarantees of article 14 of the
Mexican Constitution, reflected in the Civil Code, support an argument that the due process
minimum in the commercial code mandates such reasoning.
The form of the award permitted under the UNCITRAL rules thus may also conflict with
the two codes. UNCITRAL article 32(4) permits the parties to agree that the award may be
granted without reasons. Because the non-waivable "due process" guarantees of the codes
arguably encompass reasoned opinions, such an agreement would be unenforceable.
143. For example, commercial code article 1434 granting arbitrators the right to resolve
"any incidental issues that must be decided prior to the principal subject matter" may permit
arbitrators to address their own jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute. C6d.Com. art. 1434.
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codes maintain the possibility that arbitrations actually will be subject
to unfavorable readings of the commercial and procedural codes.
These problems are set against a backdrop of other technical
problems with the arbitration law, such as poor definitions and con-
fusing references.'"
In addition, Mexican law retains pitfalls for the unwary due to an
outgrowth of North-South tensions. 145 Accordingly, the foreign com-
pany seeking to arbitrate matters with its Mexican counterpart would
rightfully fear that its contractual intention to resolve disputes pursu-
ant to agreed procedures will not be honored.
Mexican arbitration law has advanced sufficiently to allow for-
eign businesspeople to structure acceptable arbitration clauses with
Mexican companies. Any such arbitration clause must be more spe-
cific than typical arbitration clauses. Procedures should be specified
carefully and the default use of formal Mexican court procedures
expressly disclaimed. 146 Substantive Mexican law also should be
examined to determine whether the subject matter is somehow
exempted from resolution by a specific law or policy. These steps will
not eliminate conflict-parties will not and should not agree, for
example, to allow arbitrators to control settlement-but will make it
likely that Mexican courts will enforce arbitration awards and
clauses. Additionally, setting the arbitration outside Mexico will limit
conflict to the enforcement provisions. However, enforcement may
raise identical procedural issues if Mexican courts conclude that the
public policy exceptions to enforcement in the Conventions and the
144. Commercial code articles refer to both "arbitrator or arbitrators," C6d.Com. art.
1417, and "arbitrator," C6d.Com. art. 1428(I). Thus, when article 1428(I) of the commercial
code states that the arbitration ends upon the death of the "arbitrator," the procedure when
one of three arbitrators dies is unclear.
Commercial code article 1435 states that "when issuing the award, the arbitrators may
charge the parties with payment of legal fees, damages and losses. However, in order to use
coercive measures they must resort to court assistance." C6d.Com. art. 1435. The
relationship between the court and the arbitrators remains obscure. Arbitrators never may
enforce awards; thus, the inclusion of this phrase is simply a puzzle.
145. Examples of such North-South tensions are set out in Kurth, supra note 11, at 600 n.6
(only Mexican businesses, approved foreign companies, or persons born or naturalized as
Mexican citizens may own land; certain acts must be reported to the National Technology
Transfer Registry; foreign investors restricted to 49% ownership of business entity absent
other relevant ceiling); see also Gretchen A. Pemberton & Mariano Soni, Jr., Mexico's 1991
Industrial Property Law, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 103 (1992) (industrial property law
potentially confusing).
146. See Julio Trevino, Outline of Presentation, Mexico-United States Arbitration
Conference (Oct. 18, 1990) (unpublished collection available from American Arbitration
Association) (recommending that parties refer to rules of an arbitral institution to counteract
restrictive provisions of the amended commercial code).
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procedural code encompass the due process guarantees in the
Constitution.
Even these problems well may disappear in the years to come.
Every development during the last twenty years, including adherence
to the Conventions, judicial enforcement of arbitration awards and
clauses and commercial code reform, has constituted a significant
advance.'47 Unless these advances are somehow repealed, the pub-
licista elements of the arbitration scheme must fall to court decisions,
additional legislative reform, or both.'48 Ultimately, however, the dif-
ficulties surrounding arbitration in Mexico or with Mexican compa-
nies will not be eliminated until Mexican law finally jettisons the
century-old publicista approach to arbitration. Until then, arbitration
with Mexican companies always will be somewhat of a gamble, with
the hope that the principles of international commercial arbitration
codified in the New York and Panama Conventions will trump the
remaining cumbersome strictures of Mexican law. 149
147. Hoagland, supra note 5, at 99 (arbitration an increasingly viable alternative to
litigation in Mexico).
148. Id. at 91 ("International commercial arbitration in the United Mexican States
proceeds on a firmer legal footing following major amendments of the Code of Commerce in
January, 1989.") Such praise, however, should be considered critically. Advocates of Mexican
arbitration appear to have made a subtle effort to minimize the procedural requirements
remaining in Mexican arbitration law. Dr. Siqueiros, the foremost authority on Mexican
arbitration law, reproduced commercial code article 1347-A which describes the conditions
precedent for enforcement of foreign awards in his contribution to the 1991 Yearbook of
Commercial Arbitration. That provision, as noted above, did not require notification of the
defendant in the arbitration via personal service. Dr. Siqueiros did not, however, reproduce
the new provisions on homologacidn incorporated in commercial code article 1347-A. These
provisions maintain the personal service requirement and impose new burdens on a litigant
who seeks to enforce arbitration awards. C6d.Com. art. 1347-A; C.P.C.D.F. art. 606.
149. See Hoagland, supra note 5, at 99 ("Absent additional legislation, the future of
arbitration in Mexico will largely depend on how the judiciary applies the law."); Lima, supra
note 7, at 157.
1993]
